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Abstract:
Testing many individuals for a reasonably rare condition using imperfect, time consuming, and expensive tests
can be facilitated by pooling. Pooling groups samples from different individuals that are then tested for the
existence of a pathogen. An individual is diagnosed as a carrier if a threshold of the tests to which the individual
contributed samples is positive. Our assumptions dictate a testing strategy that is not adaptive, with the

exception of retesting positively diagnosed persons individually. Pooling is a standard proposal to stretch the
supply of test kits. We show that it can also be used to control the false positive and false negative rate of tests,
as long as errors are attributable to the lack of quality in the tests themselves and not to a lack of progression in
the disease process where what is testable has still to develop. As the medical response to a new pandemic
becomes more sophisticated, quality issues with tests will be less prevalent and our contribution will loose
value. However, at the beginning of a new pandemic, wide-spread pooling with imperfect tests can prevent the
disease from becoming a pandemic.

SECTION I. Introduction
When the first wave of the Corona Virus pandemy expanded world-wide, countries scrambled to implemement
rapid and accurate testing at their borders. Even a year after the appearance of the virus, nationwide or even
campus-wide testing exists only in rare circumstances, despite its obvious benefits in combatting the spread of
the pandemic. Unfortunately, a new disease with pandemic potential is likely to appear in the near future. Early
aggressive testing, even if the tests are imperfect, can control the spread to the extent that health authorities
can trace the carriers who have not been caught in the dragnet of testing and isolate those they had contact
with. This presupposes the early, wide-spread availability of tests that in the beginning of a pandemic will be
quite imperfect.
Pooling or group testing is a long-established procedure to make better use of expensive tests [1]. Pooling is a
testing strategy that collects several probes from an individual, combines samples from several individuals in a
clever way into groups, and then tests each group for the presence of a pathogen or other indicator of a disease.
An individual is diagnosed as positive if samples of the individual are in a threshold number of groups that tested
positive for the disease. It was apparently first invented in 1943 in order to prevent waste in testing US army
recruits for Syphilis [2], and has now been deployed against Covid as well [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Below, in Section
III, we briefly review some pooling strategies.
The principal motivation for pooling is the better use of a scarce resource (the tests themselves) by allowing
more individuals to be tested with the same number of tests. Here, we show that they can also be used to
establish a trade-off between the false negative and the false positive rate of testing, in case the tests are
unreliable, i.e. "noisy", which can be presumed at the beginning of the pandemic. To deal with false positives,
we envision a one-step-and-a-half solution (similar to Mallapaty’s Method 4 [8]) that retest only those
diagnosed as positive. Our main goal is to limit the more dangerous false negative rate.
Our contribution shows that noisy tests can be made more reliable through pooling. The procedure is of value
whenever there is a scramble to develop and produce tests. We envision using error-prone tests in an early
stage of pandemic response, before more accurate tests become available, in order to test large swaths of the
population and to eliminate as many non-symptomatic carriers as possible from circulation through quarantine.
For Covid-19, this contribution comes too late, unless of course the virus mutates in a manner that make it
undetectible by the current tests, or in situations of lack of resources. We envision the need for testing large
populations, i.e. all people living in a certain town, all children at a school or day care facility, or all individuals
crossing a border.
A test for an infectious disease can fail for two reasons. First, we might be testing for an indicator that is
currently or not yet present in all infected individuals. This will create unavoidable false negatives. The second
reason lies in defects in the test itself or in the application of the test, for example, because of an error by the
health care worker administering the test. By not using tests from the same batch, we can assume that failures
due to bad quality are almost independent of each other. By organizing testing, we can also achieve that failures

in test procedure are not only rare but also almost independent of each other, for instance, by producing several
separated lines of test processing.

Fig. 1. Fano Plane.
As a more concrete example, assume a stream of travellers crossing a border. A few health care workers take
independently repeated samples from the mouth of each traveller and one also from the nose. These samples
receive an electronic tag. Within a few minutes, these samples are assigned to different batches based on a
procedure that guarantees that samples from a pair of travellers do not end up in the same batch more than
twice. When there are enough samples in a batch, the batch is tested, and the results are electronically stored
and periodically evaluated. (Notice that the information processing needs are simple enough to be done on a
smart phone). When the test results are available, individuals likely to be infected are identified and asked to
quarantine immediately or confirm the presence or absence of an infection with a more accurate test. How this
is done will depend of course on the time it takes to perform the tests, so the travellers might have already
moved on. If instead of travellers we have children at a school or students at a university campus, the logistic
challenges are much more limited.
In the remainder of this article, we first discuss grouping a batch of N individuals into fixed sized groups. Since
testing takes time, we do not consider adaptive pooling schemes. We then calculate the false positive and false
negative rates in dependence on the overall prevalence of the virus. Our schemes are successful, but can of
course not work create an accuracy out of nothing, meaning that we cannot identify infected individuals whose
infection cannot be picked up by the test, but can deal with shortcomings of individual tests.

SECTION II. Grouping
A. Fano Plane

To illustrate the power of our method, we start with a simple example. The Fano plane consists of seven points
0, 1, …, 6 grouped into seven lines, see Figure 1, which shows six lines as straight lines and one line as a circle.
Each point lies in exactly three lines and each line has exactly three points. A line is uniquely determined by any
two points. This makes the Fano Plane into a Steiner Triple System, named S(2, 3, 7), an instance of an
Incomplete Block Design [9]. In our context, a point corresponds to an individual and the groups to the lines.

For decision making, we adopt as is common a threshold strategy. This choice is dictated to us because a priori,
each individual is equally suspicious of being infected. First, we look at a threshold of k = 3, and accordingly,
diagnose an individual as diseased if all three of the three samples containing a probe of that individual are
positive.

Fig. 2. Fano Plane: Example for a False Positive.
Even if the test is perfectly accurate, this scheme allows for false positives, but never for false negatives. Figure
2 gives an example, where individuals 0, 1, and 3 are infected. The probe of individual 5 is contained in groups
{0, 2, 5}, {3, 4, 5}, and {1, 5, 6}, all of which contain a diseased individual’s probe and are therefore positive. Thus,
with any threshold (other than 0), individual 5 is diagnosed as likely to be infected. Presumably, this will result in
an order to quarantine until a more accurate test or retesting will liberate it. Individuals 2, 4, and 6 escape this
fate, since they form a group without infected individuals. Let ρ denote the incidence rate of infections, i.e. the
probability that a randomly chosen individual is infected. Then the individual suffers a false positive diagnosis if
(a) the individual is not infected (with probability 1 − ρ), and (b) in each group, at least one of the other two
individuals is infected. The probability that there is an infected person in a group of two is ρ2 + 2(1 − ρ)ρ and the
probability for (b) is 2ρ3 − ρ6. For an infection rate of 1%, this amounts to 7.8 × 10−6. As we lower the threshold,
the false positive probability moves from 8ρ3 −20ρ4 +18ρ5−7ρ6 +ρ7 for a threshold of three, to
12ρ2−40ρ3+55ρ4−39ρ5+14ρ6−2ρ7 for threshold two, and to 6ρ−21ρ2+35ρ3−35ρ4+21ρ5 −7ρ6+ρ7 for threshold one.
Obviously, threshold one gives us an unacceptable high false positive rate, but the quadratic component of ρ for
threshold two is quite acceptable for low infection rates. At an infection rate of 1%, the false positive rate is
0.116%.
For a completely accurate test, this added probability of false negatives does not buy us anything, but the
situation is different if there is a non-negligible false negative rate. If individuum 1 is infected, then three instead
of only one group can show this infection.
False negatives are much more dangerous than false positives, since they threaten whole communities instead
of causing a severe inconvenience to an individual. Calculating rates exactly is however difficult and we use
simulation that is easier to verify. We simulated the Fano plane testing plan using Python. We also calculated
99% confidence intervals, but do not display them in the graphs because we increased the number of
simulations so much that the difference betweeen the upper and lower bound could not be visibly detected in
our graphs. In our graphs, we give the rates in percents, not in absolute values. We assumed a false positive rate
of 1% and false negative rates of 10%, 20%, and 30%. We give the results in Fig. 3, where we also give the rate of
false positives and negatives if we just test individuals without pooling. As we can see, for Threshold 1 the false
negative rates are very low, but the false positive rate very high, higher than the baseline of 1•(1−ρ)%. For
Threshold 3, the opposite happens, though the false negative rate is still improved over the baselines 10ρ%,

20ρ%, and 30ρ%, respectively. Threshold 2 balances false and negative rates successfully and makes our point
that pooling is also useful to control error rates.

Fig. 3. Fano Plane with Treshold 2: False Positives and False Negatives for imperfect tests. The False Positives
rate of the individual test is 1% and the false negative rates are 10%, 20%, and 30%.

B. Projective Plane of Order 3

An ideal layout assigns each individual to a fixed number of groups such that any two individuals share at most
one group. A number of combinatorial designs exists where each pair of two individuals shares exactly one
group. We now look at families of Incomplete Block Designs to show that this behavior is typical.
The projective plane of order 3 is such an arrangement. It is given by the following incidence matrix:

1
1
⎛1
⎜
1
⎜
0
⎜
⎜0
Π = ⎜0
⎜0
⎜0
⎜0
⎜0
0
⎝0

1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1

0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1

0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0

0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1

0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

0
0
0⎞
⎟
1
⎟
0⎟
0⎟
1⎟
1⎟
0⎟
0⎟
0⎟
1
0⎠

It consists of 13 points and 13 lines. The points correspond to the rows and the lines correspond to the columns
of the matrix. A point is incident to a line exactly if the corresponding coefficient in Π is 1. As before, we identify
individuals with points and testing groups with lines. Each point is in exactly four lines and each line contains
exactly four points. The symmetry of the incidence matrix reflects the self-duality of the geometry.
Testing proceeds as before. The samples from four individuals corresponding to the points in the same line are
mixed and evaluated together. We diagnose a diseased individual, if three of the four tests with samples from
the individual are positive. We give the results in Figure 4, where in addition to the false positive and false
negative rates we also give the false positive and false negative rates for the baseline, where we do not use
grouping but just use one test per individual.

C. Singer Difference Set

A different combinatorial approach to find Incomplete Block Designs uses difference sets. We start with the (21,
5, 1) "Singer" difference set D = {0, 1, 6, 8, 18} [9] and generate twenty-one groups by adding integers modulo 21
element-wise to D. This gives us twenty-one blocks such that each pair of numbers is in the same block exactly
once. As before, we make these blocks into our testing groups. We use a threshold of t in order to diagnose an
individual as infected. By varying the threshold between 2 and 3, we achieve moderate or extremely aggressive
control of false negatives (Figure 5), where we also assume a native false positive rate of 1%.

Fig. 4. Simulation results for the projective plane of dimension 3 with a threshold of 3.

Fig. 5. Simulation results for the difference set with thresholds two and three.

Fig. 6. Square layout.

D. Square Layout n2

Our examples so far have not saved in the number of tests. For example, the Fano plane yields a test battery of
seven tests for seven individuals and the projective plane a battery of thirteen tests for thirteen individuals.
Drawing on experience in designing failure resilient disk arrays, we generalize now a square layout for disk
arrays, [10]. Other designs from this field can also be applied to pooling.
We arrange a group of n2 individuals in a square. Each individual is grouped into four groups of n individuals,
consisting of a row, a column, a main diagonal, and a secondary diagonal. If the size of the square is even, n2/2
of the diagonals will intersect a secondary diagonal in two fields of the square. This is not a big detriment to our
schemes as our simulations will show, but it is an incentive to find a cleaner design.
Unlike the previous schemes discussed above, a square layout with n > 4 saves in the total number of tests
administered, but at the cost of introducing false positives, even if each individual test does not have false
positives. As before, we denote the probability of an infection with ρ. A healthy individual will see one of their
tests pooled with an infected individual with probability
𝑝𝑝1 = 1 − (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑛𝑛−1 .

If m tests are performed, a false positive happens with probability 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 = 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 .

The rate at which we observe false positives is this probability multiplied with the rate of infected individuals,
i.e. multiplied with 1 − ρ. Figure 7 shows the result. Clearly, the incidence rate of false positives for the critical
infection rate range is quite low and can be justified just by the expected savings in tests.

Fig. 7. False Positive Rate for pooled testing of n2 individuals using three (top) and four (bottom) tests.
If there are no infected people, an n2 scheme tests n2 individuals with 3 or 4 tests per individual and uses 3n or
4n tests, respectively, or 3/n or 4/n tests per individual. We can change to a semi-adaptive scheme where
individuals diagnosed as positive through pooling are tested again. In today’s situation, the re-testing could be
done with more accurate tests, but for argument’s sake, we assume that we use the same type of tests. The
infection rate determines the number of additional tests, as we now elaborate. From the point of view of a
single person, this person is either infected and tests positive and therefore needs an additional test, or the
person is healthy, but is diagnosed positive falsely. The probability that a person will need to be tested once in
addition is therefore ρ+(1−ρ)pm. For high infection rates, almost every person will have to be tested again, so
that no savings accrue.
For low infection rates this is not the case. Figure 8 gives the result of our calculations for infection rates of up to
5% and shows that the savings of pooling are mostly maintained even if we retest. Notice that even with
threshold testing, an infected individual tests positive in all groups and is therefore correctly diagnosed. With
other words, there are no false negatives.
What happens if the tests are not error-free? The threshold number of positive tests used to diagnose an
individual as infected is then important. First, we assume that the false positive rate is negligible but a nonnegligible false negative rate gamma for each test. If we set a threshold of four out of four tests, then the false
negative rate will be almost four times as high. A threshold of three therefore seems more prudent. We now
calculate the probability of false positives and negatives.

Fig. 8. Retests per individual necessary after pooled testing of n2 individuals using three (top) and four (bottom)
tests.
A healthy person will be diagnosed infected if three or four of the groups test positive. A group tests positive if
at least one of its n − 1 other members is infected and the test is indeed positive and not a false negative. The
first condition occurs with probability 1 − (1 − ρ)n−1, the second with probability 1 − γ. Therefore, a non-infected
individual will have one of its four group tests come back positive with probability p1 = (1−γ)(1−(1−ρ)n−1) and the
battery will declare this healthy individual infected with probability
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = ( 43 )(1 − 𝑝𝑝1 )𝑝𝑝13 + 𝑝𝑝14 .

Since a portion of 1−ρ of the population are not infected, the rate at which we observe false positives is
(1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 .

A false negative can only happen to an infected individual. A single group test fails with probability 1 − γ. Two or
more of the four tests need to fail for the individual to not be diagnosed, which happens with probability
( 42 )𝛾𝛾 2 (1 − 𝛾𝛾)2 + ( 43 )𝛾𝛾 3 (1 − 𝛾𝛾) + 𝛾𝛾 4 .

Multiplying this number with ρ gives the rate at which we observe false negatives.

Fig. 9. False Positive Rate for pooled testing of n2 individuals assuming 10% and 20% false negative rates in the
individual group tests.

Fig. 10. False Negative Rate for pooled testing of n2 individuals assuming 10% and 20% false negative rates in the
individual group tests.
Figures 9 and 10 show the results. Again, we succeeded in controlling the false negative rate and overall lower
the inaccuracy of the test. For lack of space, we do not present our simulation results that confirm the
theoretical results.

SECTION III. Related Work
The idea of pooling statistical tests appears to be made first in an informal disccussion on lowering the number
of Wasserman blood tests for Syphilis among US army inductees by David Rosenblatt at the Research Division of
Price Administration in Washington in 1943 [2]. The idea was taken up by Dorfman who wrote the seminal paper
about it [11]. Besides a short note by Sterret [12], it did not receive much attention in the post-war period. Sobel
and Groll wrote a 74-page paper on group testing motivated by an industrial problem, namely whether a gas

was leaking from a device [13]. Since then, group testing or pooling has been the subject of a plethora of articles
and yielded various avenues of research.
A first division of group testing is the distinction between adaptive and non-adaptive method. Adaptive testing
lets the administration of testing depend on previous tests. This necessarily leads to longer times to decision and
is not appropriate in our context. The goal of testing can be exact recovery vs. partial recovery, where the
former is guaranteed to yield a correct diagonosis for each individual tested. Similarly, but differently, we can
distinguish between zero error probability regimens and small error probability depending on whether the set of
infected individuals is always recognized or only with high probability. A noiseless testing regimen assumes no
false positives or false negatives for each individual test.
Some algorithms require to know the number of infected individuals and sometimes assume that they are
uniform randomly distributed among the test set (a combinatorial prior), others assume that each individual is
infected with a fixed probability (a i.i.d. prior).
Here, we assumed a i.i.d. prior, and use non-adaptive threshold methods for noisy tests.
During the Covid pandemic, pooling / grouping has been proposed to help stretch rare tests. The work by
Mutesa and colleagues and Beunardeau and colleagues are outstanding examples [3], [5]. Their focus is in the
original line of Rosenbblatt and Dorfman, namely of making better use of limited or expensive tests. Here, we
deal with a quality problem in early tests.

SECTION IV. Conclusions
Pooling is a strategy used to make better use of scarce tests. Here, we showed that pooling is also a strategy to
deal with somewhat defective tests. Each test in practice has false positives and negatives, though the rates
might be negligible. The false negative rate reflects two different phenomena: First and by far more common in
mature tests, an infected individual might not exhibit the marker or set of markers for which we test. For
example, the "Fast Covid Tests" used in Germany are said to be not capable of detecting a Covid infected
individual with 30% probability five days after infection, simply because the infection process has not progressed
sufficiently. In contrast, the false negative probability for several fast tests are far less than the 20% set as a
minimum standard by the World Health Organization for symptomatic patients [14], [15]. The second and by
now presumably very rare cause for existing tests for Covid 19 is a defect in the test itself, reflecting the
spectacular success of the medical community in addressing the current pandemic. However, this is likely to
change for the next pandemic or a mutation of the virus strong enough to escape all current testing strategies.
While the second of these scenarios is unlikely, the next new infection disease will come soon, in which case
fast, wide-spread testing will be crucial in preventing it to become another pandemic.
We have shown that pooling not only has the potential to spread an insufficient number of tests, but also to
deal with variance in the quality of the tests. To this end, different groups need to be tested with different
batches of the same test, with different versions of the same test, or maybe even with completely different
tests. By adjusting the thresholds for diagnosis, we can not only control the probability and rate of false
negatives, but also balance between the rate of false positives and negatives.
Our method is limited by the effects of diluting a diseased individual’s probe with others’ probes, though
Perchetti et al. cite a community consensus that up to 30 probes are safe [6]. Our examples are below this limit,
but this might not be true for the next pandemic. A more important restriction is to approximate our
assumptions that test failures are independent of each other. Failure of a test can be caused by a failure in the
taking of the probe such as a too shallow or too deep nasal swab or contanimation with another probe. We can
assume that these happen rarely enough that we can treat these incidences as occurring independently of each

other. Another cause would be individual variations in the testing ingrediences. However, most noxious to our
assumption is the bad batch, where all tests from the same production run are partially or completely
unreliable. To counteract the bad-batch problem, testing will have to be organized such that the probes taken
from an individual use different batches, which can be done by using tests in large numbers in short periods of
times, because then the batches can be easily mixed. Ideally of course would be tests that use different
methodologies. We have not considered the implications of this because of the difficulty of modeling sets of
different false positive and false negative rates.
The design of a test battery based on pooling relies ultimately on Mathematical Combinatorics, which provides
many classes of block designs, especially if a small number of tests is desired. We could generalize our results by
replacing block designs that work for a fixed sized-set of individuals (e.g. 13) with open designs capable of
placing a continuous stream of individuals into a set of small groups such that no two individuals are placed into
the same group twice or more.
Finally, wide-spread testing is just one of many ways to successfully counteract the spread of an infectious
disease. Contact tracing, hot spot identification, preventive measures as well as fast vaccine development all
combine with testing in a successful strategy.
In summary, in addition to help stretch scarce testing resources, pooling can be used to control noisiness in
tests. This allows for more effective mass screening at the beginning of a pandemic when diagnostics have not
yet matured. This aspect will loose importance as the medical response to a pandemic becomes more effective.
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